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Frequently Asked QuestionsUpdated November 2007 1. What caused the gas leak?2. Who could have sabotaged plant operations and caused the gas leak? 3. If sabotage is the suspected cause, why was this person not brought to justice? 4. Were the valves on the MIC tanks at the plant "faulty"? 5. Were there safety concerns at the plant before the tragedy? 6. Why didn’t the plant’s safety systems contain the leak? 7. How do you respond to concerns expressed about the technologies used at the plant prior to the incident? 8. Who owned the Bhopal plant at the time of the incident and who owns it now? 9. Did Union Carbide India Limited abandon the Bhopal plant after the gas leak? 10. What did Union Carbide do to assist Bhopal victims after the gas leak? 11. Were the environmental standards at the Bhopal plant inferior to those at Union Carbide's U.S. operations? 12. Did the gas leak contaminate the groundwater and soil outside the plant? 13. Did the day-to-day operations of the plant contaminate the groundwater or soil outside the plant? 14. What remediation work has been performed at the site? 15. What about claims of contaminated groundwater outside the plant contaminating the adjoining region? 16. What is the status of litigation against Union Carbide regarding remediation of the site and/or paying additional restitution to victims? 17. Has the Government of India paid out the settlement money to the victims? 18. Media reports indicate that the victims are still suffering. What are you doing about this? 19. What processes have been put in place industry-wide to prevent a tragedy like this from occurring again? 1. What caused the gas leak?
Shortly after the gas release, Union Carbide launched an aggressive effort to identify the cause. An initial investigation by Union Carbide experts showed that a large volume of water had apparently been introduced into the methylisocyanate (MIC) tank. This caused a chemical reaction that forced the pressure release valve to open and allowed the gas to leak. A committee of experts working on behalf of the Indian government conducted its own investigation and reached the same conclusion. An independent investigation by engineering consulting firm Arthur D. Little determined that the water could only have been introduced into the tank deliberately, since process safety systems -- in place and operational -- would have prevented water from entering the tank by accident. 2. Who could have sabotaged plant operations and caused the gas leak?
Investigations suggest that only an employee with the appropriate skills and knowledge of the site could have tampered with the tank. An independent investigation by the engineering consulting firm Arthur D. Little determined that the water could only have been introduced into the tank deliberately, since process safety systems -- in place and operational -- would have prevented water from entering the tank by accident. 3. If sabotage is the suspected cause, why was this person not brought to justice?
The Indian authorities are well aware of the identity of the employee and the nature of the evidence against him. 4. Were the valves on the MIC tanks at the plant "faulty"?
No. In fact, documented evidence gathered after the incident showed that the valve close to the plant's water-washing operation was closed and leak-tight. Furthermore, process safety systems -- in place and operational -- would have prevented water from entering the tank by accident. 5. Were there safety concerns at the plant before the tragedy?
No. In 1982, a technical team from Union Carbide visited the Bhopal plant to conduct a routine process safety review, and identified some safety issues to be addressed by the plant. All of those issues had been addressed by the plant well before the December 1984 gas leak. None of them had anything to do with the incident. 6. Why didn’t the plant’s safety systems contain the leak?
Based on several investigations, the safety systems in place could not have prevented a chemical reaction of this magnitude from causing a leak. In designing the plant's safety systems, a chemical reaction of this magnitude was not factored in for two reasons: 1. The tank's gas storage system was designed to automatically prevent such a large amount of water from being inadvertently introduced into the system; and
2. Process safety systems -- in place and operational -- would have prevented water from entering the tank by accident. The system design did not, however, account for the deliberate introduction of a large volume of water by an employee. 7. How do you respond to concerns expressed about the technologies used at the plant prior to the incident?
Most of the attacks on the Bhopal plant's operation were made before the investigations were complete and often by people searching for a quick explanation for a terrible disaster. Critics' suggestions that three certain technologies may have been in use are incorrect. Two of the technologies (a carbon monoxide process and a MIC-to-Sevin process) were never used at the plant. A naphthol process developed by Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) was shut down permanently in 1982, two years before the incident. None of them had anything to do with the incident. Employee sabotage – not faulty design or operation – was the cause of the tragedy. 8. Who owned the Bhopal plant at the time of the incident and who owns it now?
The Bhopal plant was owned and operated by Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL), an Indian company in which Union Carbide Corporation held just over half of the stock. Indian financial institutions and thousands of private investors in India held the rest of the stock. In 1994, Union Carbide sold its entire interest in UCIL to MacLeod Russell (India) Limited, which renamed the company Eveready Industries India, Limited (Eveready Industries). In 1998, the state government of Madhya Pradesh revoked Eveready Industries's lease on and took possession of the facility and publicly assumed all accountability for the site, including the completion of any further remediation. 9. Did Union Carbide India Limited abandon the Bhopal plant after the gas leak?
No. UCIL, an Indian company, managed and operated the Bhopal plant on a day-to-day basis at the time of the gas leak. After the incident, UCIL completed one of the most single important remediation activities – the transformation and removal of tens of thousands of pounds of MIC from the plant. In the years following the tragedy, the Indian government severely restricted access to the site. Only in the years just prior to the sale was UCIL able to undertake additional clean-up work, spending some $2 million on that effort. Every step of that clean-up work was approved, monitored and directed by the central and state government authorities in India. We understand that, after the sale of UCIL stock in 1994, Eveready Industries continued the clean-up work at the site until 1998, when the state government of Madhya Pradesh took possession, publicly assuming all accountability for the site, including the completion of any further remediation. 10. What did Union Carbide do to assist Bhopal victims after the gas leak?
Immediately following the gas release, Union Carbide Corporation began providing aid to the victims and established a process to resolve their claims. Among the many efforts Union Carbide took to address the situation were:
In 1989, Union Carbide and UCIL entered into a $470 million legal settlement with the Indian Government that settled all claims arising from the incident. The settlement was affirmed by the Indian Supreme Court, which described it as "just, equitable and reasonable." The money was promptly paid to the Government of India by Union Carbide and UCIL. (Please see "The Incident, Response and Settlement" section of this website for additional information on UCC's efforts and contributions.) 11. Were the environmental standards at the Bhopal plant inferior to those at Union Carbide's U.S. operations?
No. To the contrary, the Bhopal plant design had the benefit of knowledge acquired from the operation of older chemical facilities. For example, as compared to other similar plants, Environmental Impact Assessment ratings for the Bhopal plant show favorable ratings in wastewater disposal and carbon monoxide emissions and, essentially, the same ratings as other similar plants for potential effects on human health. 12. Did the gas leak contaminate the groundwater and soil outside the plant?
No. Indian government authorities have publicly and repeatedly confirmed that no contamination of soil or groundwater outside the plant walls resulted from the gas leak. 13. Did the day-to-day operations of the plant contaminate the groundwater or soil outside the plant?
No. A report issued by the India's National Environmental Engineering Research Institute (NEERI) in 1997 found soil contamination within the factory premises at three major areas that had been used as chemical disposal and treatment areas. However, the study found no evidence of groundwater contamination outside the plant and concluded that local water-wells were not affected by plant disposal activities. A 1998 study of drinking-water sources near the plant site by the Madhya Pradesh Pollution Control Board did find some contamination, but it was unrelated to the plant. The Control Board did not find any traces of chemicals linked to chemicals formerly used at the UCIL plant. Rather, the Control Board found that the contamination likely was caused by improper drainage of water and other sources of environmental pollution. While we are aware of conflicting claims being made by various groups and reported in the media, we have no first-hand knowledge of what chemicals, if any, may remain at the site and what impact, if any, they may be having on area groundwater. The Hindustan Times reported on April 29, 2006, that “A study by the National Institute of Occupational Health (NIOH), Ahmedabad, has virtually debunked voluntary organisations' fear about contamination of water in and around Union Carbide plant….” “...the report says that serum levels of pesticide residue (DDT & HCH) and mercury in the blood of people living adjacent to the plant are comparable with the level of these compounds reported from other parts of the country. It further said that the results of study showed that contents of VOCs [volatile organic compounds] i.e., benzene, toluene, xylene and cholorobenzene, in water samples were not detected and were found below the detection limit of the instrument, i.e., 2 ppm [parts per million]….” “…MP [Madhya Pradesh] High Court is also seized of a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) on the issue and has been monitoring progress of Union Carbide plant's cleaning up operation undertaken by the MP Pollution Control Board at its behest. Now, the State Government has filed the NIOH report in the High Court in support of its contention that hazardous wastes lying in the Union Carbide were not contaminating water….” “…The NIOH team, in its report, has concluded that serum levels of DDT and HCH and mercury level in blood of people affected by contamination was comparable with the levels of these compounds from any other part of the country. ...Similarly, the levels of mercury in water and soil sample outside the UCIL compound and other locations were also comparable with the levels of mercury reported from other parts of the country....” For additional information, we suggest you contact the state government of Madhya Pradesh. 14. What remediation work has been performed at the site?
In the years following the tragedy, the Indian government severely restricted access to the site. Only in the latter years prior to the sale was UCIL able to undertake additional clean-up work, spending some $2 million on that effort. Every step of that clean-up work was approved, monitored and directed by the central and state government authorities in India. We understand that, after the sale of UCIL stock in 1994, Eveready Industries continued the clean-up work at the site until 1998. That year, the state government of Madhya Pradesh revoked Eveready's lease on and took possession of the facility and publicly assumed all accountability for the site, including the completion of any further remediation. What additional clean-up work, if any, has been undertaken since that time is unclear. 15. What about claims of contaminated groundwater outside the plant contaminating the adjoining region?
While we are aware of conflicting claims being made by various groups and reported in the media, we have no first-hand knowledge of what chemicals, if any, may remain at the site and what impact, if any they may be having on area groundwater. It is important to note, however, that a 1998 study of drinking-water sources near the plant site by the Madhya Pradesh Pollution Control Board did find some contamination that likely was caused by improper drainage of water and other sources of environmental pollution. The Control Board did not find any traces of chemicals linked to chemicals formerly used at the UCIL plant. And, the Hindustan Times reported on April 29, 2006, that "A study by the National Institute of Occupational Health (NIOH), Ahmedabad, has virtually debunked voluntary organisations' fear about contamination of water in and around Union Carbide plant….” (See Question 13 for more details.) We believe it is important for the State of Madhya Pradesh to complete the remediation of the plant site. The State is in the best position to evaluate all scientific information that is available and make the right decision for 16. What is the status of litigation against Union Carbide regarding remediation of the site and/or paying additional restitution to victims?
In 1989, Union Carbide and UCIL entered into a $470 million legal settlement with the Indian Government, settling all claims arising from the incident. The settlement was affirmed by the Indian Supreme Court, which described it as "just, equitable and reasonable." The money was promptly paid to the Government of India by Union Carbide and UCIL. A lawsuit filed in U.S. District Court in 1999 asserting claims for personal injuries and property damage arising out the Bhopal gas disaster was dismissed, and all subsequent appeals in the case have upheld the dismissal. Another case, filed in November 2004, and making similar claims, has been dismissed at several levels, but remains under appeal with the Second Circuit Court in New York. A third case, filed in March 2007, and making similar claims as well, has been stayed pending the resolution of the 2004 case. 17. Has the Government of India paid out the settlement money to the victims?
The Government of India (GOI) enacted the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster Act in 1985, enabling the GOI to act as the sole legal representative of the victims in claims arising from or related to the Bhopal disaster. Pursuant to the settlement, therefore, the GOI assumed responsibility for disbursing funds from the $470-million settlement and providing medical coverage to citizens of Bhopal in the event of future illnesses. In July 2004, fifteen years after reaching settlement, the Supreme Court of India ordered the Government of India to release all additional settlement funds to the victims. Unfortunately, in April 2005, the Supreme Court of India granted a request from the Welfare Commission for Bhopal Gas Victims and extended to April 30, 2006, the distribution of the rest of the funds by the Welfare Commission. News reports indicated that approximately $390 million remained in the fund at that time as a result of earned interest. In September 2006, India media reported the registrar in the office of Welfare Commission said that “all cases of initial compensation claims by victims of the 1984 Bhopal gas tragedy…and revision petitions had been cleared; no case was pending….” If the media report was accurate, this could mean that all the settlement money has finally been distributed. 18. Media reports indicate that the victims are still suffering. What are you doing about this?
UCC has contributed significantly in providing aid to the victims and has fulfilled every responsibility and obligation it had in It is important to remember that when the Supreme Court of India affirmed the settlement in 1991, the Court also:
19. What processes have been put in place industry-wide to prevent a tragedy like this from occurring again?
Union Carbide, together with the rest of the chemical industry, has worked to develop and globally implement its “Responsible Care” program, designed to prevent any future events through improving community awareness, emergency preparedness and process safety standards. For more information on Responsible Care®, please visit www.responsiblecare.com or www.icca-chem.org (the web site of the International Council of Chemical Associations). |
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